We study a dynamic equilibrium model in which agents have adaptive expectations and monetary authorities pursue an inflation target. We show how alternative monetary stabilization policies become more effective when fiscal constraints on deficits are implemented, although they are not binding at the equilibrium target. In particular, we show that the inflation target equilibrium can be locally, or even globally, stable for a large class of adaptive learning schemes. We also compare alternative stabilization policies in terms of their stability properties. Commonly postulated conditional Taylor-type rules tend to be dominated by other rules, such as an unconditional Friedman type.
INTRODUCTION
As monetary policy design enters the twenty-first century, the more than halfcentury-old Friedman (1948) dictum, "rules rather than discretion," seems to define the predominant view among academics and many central bankers. More specifically, a goal of price stability has become the norm and, to this aim, two policy options dominate the debate. One is the need for fiscal constraints (at least constraints on seignorage) as a way to force monetary authorities to pursue price stability. The second is the more or less explicit implementation of an inflation target rule. The former is seen as a commitment device whereas the second is seen, once commitment has been granted, as a stabilization policy. We focus on
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In taking into account the role of fiscal (seignorage) constraints in economies with adaptive learning agents, we follow up on the recent work of Evans et al. (2000) . However, in contrast to that work, we consider alternative policies for the central bank (they only consider fixed seignorage financing) and a wider class of (deterministic) learning rules for private agents. In particular, our analysis of alternative stabilization policy rules aims at shedding some light on the discussion of how inflation target policies should be designed. Our analysis of a wide class of learning rules aims at taking into account the fact that, when observed inflation differs from the fixed (trivially stationary) target, private agents are likely to place more weight on recent data. Taking this broader perspective allows us to study how different parameters affect the price stability under alternative rules. For example, we show how fiscal constraints may enhance price stabilization in ways that could not be captured either by rational expectations models or by adaptive learning models with decreasing gain [such as least-squares learning, as studied by Evans et al. (2000b) ].
We show how different monetary instruments are equivalent to the use of a single intermediate instrument determining the ex-post real return on money. In setting the value of such an instrument (e.g., what would correspond to setting the current interbank rate), the central bank may condition on current information (i.e., deviations from an output target), but also has to forecast the demand for money, which, in our model, reduces to forecast "private agents' expectations." Different inflation target policies differ on how the government conditions on past data and on its beliefs regarding private agents' expectations. The policy that we identify as "optimal" is the one that uses all available information and, therefore, conditions on observed deviations. Such a policy is consistent with rational expectations, in the sense that the monetary authority, assumed to be fully committed to its policy, forecasts that private agents expect that the target will be achieved in the short run. Such a policy is of the form of the inflation target policies proposed by Svensson (1997) and others. However, under our policy, the target is only one of many possible rational expectations equilibria. In fact, as Benhabib et al. (1999) have recently shown, Taylor-rule policies may result in indeterminacy and, in particular, in paths that diverge from the target (when policy is "active"; see Section 2). Along these paths, as often happens with observed series, inflation is autocorrelated and deviations from target cannot be accounted for as simple stochastic innovations.
What should inflation target policy be when deviations from target are not innovations? A first possibility is to think that the optimal policy remains in place. Implicitly, this is the view adopted by the existing literature on Taylor rules [see, e.g., McCallum (1997) , Mishkin and Posen (1997) , and Clarida et al. (1997a)] . A second possibility is to go back to Friedman's recommendation and postulate an unconditional policy consistent with the long-run objectives. Finally, the central bank can try to "forecast how private agents forecast." This, of course, is not a closed-or well-defined-possibility and it raises a number of interesting issues. We find that, if the central bank succeeds at such forecasting game, then, as in the rational expectations case, the target should prevail in the short run and the best forecast of private agents' beliefs is the same target (see Section 2). However, central banks may not be that farsighted; they may simply postulate a certain amount of inertia on how private agents forecast. As a canonical example, we postulate a simple (fixed) adaptive rule as a conditional inflation target rule. Studying and comparing the performance of the three rules, in an economy in which agents' expectations are adaptive, is the central theme of this paper. For all three rules, there is, of course, a misspecification problem: The central bank does not implement a rule that is fully consistent with how private agents learn, nor do private agents postulate learning rules fully consistent with the actual law of motion implied by the central bank policy.
1 Nevertheless, we show that for a wide range of parameters the inflation target is a stable equilibrium of the corresponding adaptive process.
We find that, when policy is "active," under learning the inflation target is more stable when the stationary rational expectations equilibrium is a (locally unique) determinate equilibrium. In this respect our work reinforces and complements the contemporaneous work of Bullard and Mitra (1999) , who also study the E-stability of inflation target policies. 2 We study a somewhat narrower set of policies than they do, and we provide a full characterization of stability results, not only by considering local stability of a wide class of constant gain rules, but also by considering associated global stability properties.
It is in the global analysis that this paper breaks more novel ground: first, by showing how fiscal constraints may affect the global stability of the target, and, second, by making use of some new results on global bifurcations.
3
Our exercise provides a better understanding of how three basic parameters interact with and affect price stability. Two are, to a large extent, policy parameters: (1) how low the inflation target is set in relation to the inflation level at which there is no demand for money; and (2) the tightness of the fiscal constraint. The remaining parameter is endogenous to agents' learning process: (3) how much weight they place on previous-period observed information (i.e., the size of the gain or tracking parameter). In addition, we show how the three, seemingly similar, policies can result in quite different dynamics. As a result, we can provide local and global stability rankings. We show that, in these stability rankings, what appears to be the optimal policy on other grounds actually tends to be dominated by the alternative policies. In particular, Friedman's unconditional rule performs remarkably well as stabilization policy. This may provide a rationale for the observed fact [see Clarida et al. (1997b) ] that central banks appear to react much less aggressively to incoming information than standard analyses of Taylor rules suggest.
The paper is divided into two important sections. Section 2 develops the model while Section 3, the bulk of the paper, contains the local and global stability results.
INFLATION TARGET POLICIES
In this section, we first consider a general monetary model of inflation targeting. In the next subsection, we provide a specific cash-in-advance interpretation of the model.
The consolidated intertemporal government budget constraint takes the form
where g t is government expenditures; p t τ t is tax revenues; M s t+1 and B s t+1 are the supplies of money and government bonds, respectively, at the end of period t; and I t is the nominal rate of return on bonds (contracted in period t − 1 at that rate). It is assumed that the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints satisfies a transversality condition and, therefore, that the government satisfies its presentvalue budget constraint. It is convenient to express (1) as
In the last equality, debts and rates of return are specified in real terms. In particular, R b t is the realized real rate of return on bonds. With this compact formulation, d t can be identified as the instrument used to implement the target, although, in practice, changes on the right-hand side of (2) correspond to open-market operations, interbank rate interventions, etc. Although it may be important for policy design, in our model the exact form through which d t changes is not relevant for the dynamic effects of the policy. 
We consider economies in which the demand for real balances takes the form
where π e t+1 is the agents' expected inflation.
Introducing Inflation Target Policies
An inflation target policy specifies a desired level of inflation together with a level of d t as a function of the available information in period t. We consider recursive policies. More specifically, consistent with the intertemporal equilibrium map (3), we consider policies of the form 
Notice that, with the assumption that private agents have rational expectations, equation (4) reduces to π t = φ (P) (π t , π t+1 ). That is, we can derive an equilibrium map, ψ (P) , such that rational expectations equilibrium paths are those satisfying
Using equation (3), inflation target policies take the form
where
t+1 denotes the (government) expected demand for real balances conditional on the available information at the beginning of period t. That is, the resulting policy is conditional on past and expected future real balances.
To see the sense in which these policies are of the type of those proposed by Taylor (1993) and Svensson (1997) , and estimated by Clarida et al. (1997a,b) , let
That is, the central bank's optimal reaction is to increase the money supply if either the expected demand for real balances is above the target or the realized one is below the target, so as to adapt to any expected deviation from target or adjust for any experienced deviation from target. More specifically, in the special (linear)
, equation (7) can be written as
showing that the government reaction should be to increase the money supply above the target level if it expects the private sector's forecasted inflation to be below the target or if past expectations of inflation were too high. However, as can be seen from equation (6), with such a feedback rule the rate of return on money
In other words, realized inflation differs from target inflation only if the government miscalculates the private sector's demands. In fact, when the government knows the money demand function, the target is achieved-immediately-as long as the government accurately forecasts the private sector's expectations of inflation. This also means that the forecast consistent with rational expectations is E g t π t+1 = π * , which results in the optimal target policy
where the money supply is constant except for deviations of realized real balances from their target level (or output deviations, in the constant-velocity case). Furthermore, consistency with rational expectations also implies that
In other words, the expected money growth must be the constant growth implied by the desired inflation target. The constant growth of money rule d * is, in fact, the rule proposed by Milton Friedman, who explicitly advocated "rules rather than discretion" and also advocated designing short-run rules in terms of long-term objectives and not in terms of discretionary reactions to economic fluctuations [e.g., Friedman (1948) It is convenient to consider the inverse map of equation (5), say ϕ ≡ ψ −1 . In fact, provided that ϕ (P) (π) > 0, ifπ is a SREE and ϕ (P) (π) > 1, then the corresponding target policy is called active and the corresponding SREE is determinate, whereas if ϕ (P) (π) < 1, then the policy is called passive and there is indeterminacy, in the sense that a continuum of REE has a long-run inflation ofπ, that is a continuum of solutions of (5) with π t →π [see, e.g., Leeper (1991) or Benhabib et al. (1999) ].
It is easy to see that, under any of the two policies, we have ϕ (P) (π ) > 0 and, provided that π * is the lower-inflation SREE, ϕ (P) (π * ) > 1. The high SREE is, in contrast, indeterminate and, correspondingly, the O policy is passive at b/(1+π * ) while the F policy is passive at b/π * . However, at high-inflation SREE, as well as along the REE hyperinflationary paths approaching them, the government should realize that its target policy is not being achieved and, therefore, the rationality of the policy should be questioned. In other words, these paths are not fully consistent with rational expectations on the part of the government.
What should the government do if it observes m d t = m * ? 5 In the following, we explore several plausible options, but we do not provide a complete answer to this question. We first consider the case in which the government simply follows the optimal policy O even when output (i.e., real balance) deviations are autocorrelated. However, Friedman's implicit criticism of conditional policies as possibly being too "overreactive" may apply to this case and, therefore, we also consider the unconditional policy F.
Policies based on forecasts of private agents' forecasts.
Facing deviations from rational expectations, the government may want to infer how private agents forecast inflation. As we have said, if the government succeeds at "learning how private agents learn," then the resulting inflation must be the target, but then private agents' forecasts (forecasting rules) may be affected by the corresponding shift to the announced target. This problem is similar to that of using "good predictors" of inflation as a guide for monetary policy. As Woodford (1994) has argued, such "nonstandard indicators" suffer from the Lucas critique problem: As much as they are "good predictors," if they are used in the design of policy, then they should cease to be good indicators.
Let us assume that government's ability to accurately predict how private agents forecast is limited. In particular, since a broad class of learning rules show some degree of inertia, 6 a benchmark option to consider is that the government postulates that inertia persists; that is,
Inertia in private agents' forecasts results in autocorrelated deviations from target. In particular, notice that if agents update their estimates of inflation according to an adaptive rule of the form
with α t ∈ (0, 1), α t ≈ 0 (or α t 0 as is the case when they use standard OLS techniques), then the government is almost right (in the limit) in postulating that inertia persists, although they could choose better predictors of private agents' forecasts-namely, the same rule (8)! Postulating that (one-period) inertia persists, we get an inflation target policy of the form
For π * > 1 (i.e., R * < 1), whenever real balances (output) are below the target, this policy recommends reducing the money supply below the target because it adapts to the expected low money demand. Such a recommendation is the opposite of the recommendation under the optimal policy d O , which only takes into account the current period downturn, but expects demand to be at the target level the following period.
The REE under the I policy is characterized by the ψ (I ) map (5): There is only one SREE corresponding to the target π * and there is a continuum of REE paths with the property that, in the long run, money loses its value. Notice that when π * = 1, I is equivalent to F. Of course, along nonstationary REE paths, there is an element of irrationality on the part of the government because its inertia assumption is not satisfied.
In summary, we consider the three alternative stabilization policies, O, F, and I . However, it should be clear from our discussion that, within our class of models, other policies may be considered, reflecting central bank perceptions of how the private sector will forecast inflation, given its announced policy. Nevertheless, a careful stability analysis of our benchmark policies may help us to understand how policies should be modified in order to enhance stability properties. In particular, we are interested in contrasting the performance of the so-called optimal policy with the other two policies. To do this, in what follows, we describe the dynamics of the model with adaptive private agents and a linear demand
As we will see, although the design of an optimal fiscal and monetary mix, under rational expectations, does not place any restriction on b − π * , other than b − π * > 0, the saturation value b may determine the success of the inflation target π * . The fact that the stability of the inflation target may be affected by the point of currency collapse, even if a collapse never occurs, is a general feature of our results. Our linear demand formulation simplifies the corresponding analysis.
Introducing Fiscal Constraints
Nonnegative prices require m d t+1 − d t ≥ 0. Here, we follow Evans et al. (2000) in considering constrained policies that satisfy m
In particular, we consider a constraint on the ratio of seignorage to (private) GDP,
By equation (3),
Notice that if, instead, the constraint is a deficit to (private) GDP constraint of the form
, as in a (targeted) steady-state budget. We abstract from the exact nature of the constraint, but we assume that ex-post policies satisfyd
for some policy parameter λ. In particular, we are interested in studying how the stability of inflation target policies is affected by such a fiscal constraint parameter. Notice, however, that such a constraint does not mitigate (and may actually worsen) the indeterminacy problem of REE. More specifically, with full commitment and rational expectations, there is no rationale for imposing constraints of this type [see Evans et al. (2000b) ]. Of course, with limited commitment and rational expectations, there may be a stabilizing role for fiscal constraints [see, e.g., Giovannetti et al. (2000) ]. As in Evans et al. (2000b) , this paper shows that, with full commitment and adaptive expectations, there is also a stabilizing role for fiscal constraints.
Precautionary savings.
Unfortunately, the λ constraint is not enough to avoid currency collapses (i.e., it guarantees 1/ p t ≥ 0 but not 1/ p t > 0). One may consider policies explicitly aimed at avoiding such extreme events, however. As long as there is some minimum (residual) demand for money, currency collapses cannot occur. Here, as in Evans et al. (2000b) , we assume the existence of an > 0, such that the representative agent's demand for real balances satisfies m d (π e ) = max{b = π e , }. As we will see, such an assumption only plays a role in our global analysis in the sense that, without it, the rare event of a currency collapse cannot be dismissed. 
Introducing Adaptive Expectations
We consider that private agents predict inflation as a constant. In other words, we follow Cagan (1956) in considering a general class of learning rules in which agents condition data focusing on a minimal state variable (MSV) solution. In particular, π
where previous-period, and not-current period, inflation is used to update forecasts. This formulation is consistent with the underlying informational structure of the model and with agents not overreacting to current events (i.e., having some behavioral inertia). 9 We also assume that the weight on realized inflation, α t , is exogenous. Nevertheless, experimental evidence shows that the parameter α t tends to increase when observed paths are nonstationary. In fact, in a nonstationary environment, to use a tracking procedure (i.e., keeping α t constant) is a better learning rule than to use a stochastic approximation procedure (with α t 0), such as standard least-squares procedures. Since, on the one hand, the asymptotic analysis of the stochastic approximation case has been done by Evans et al. (2000) (only for the F policy) and, on the other hand, we want to allow for a wide range of tracking procedures, we should consider the whole class α t = α ∈ (0, 1). 
DYNAMIC MODEL WITH ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS
In this section we provide the main stability results. We start by considering some general properties of the adaptive expectations process under a general inflation target policy d (P) . Given such a policy, substituting (12) into the intertemporal equilibrium condition (4), we obtain a second order difference equation in expected inflation rates:
which, under our assumptions, takes the form
As usual, a second order difference equation is more easily studied by writing it as an equivalent system of two first order difference equations. In order to do this, let x t = π e t−1 and y t = π e t . Then equation (13) can be written in the form
with
and > 0 is a small parameter.
Some General Properties of the Models
The map (14), the iteration of which defines the time evolution of the system in the space of expected inflation, is a nonlinear piecewise continuous map on R (14) in R(I). The following result shows that, provided the fiscal constraint is not too loose, the regions, R(II), R(III), and R(IV) are transition regions.
process {x t , y t } generated by (14) visits R(I) infinitely often. In particular, either R(I) is an absorbing region for {x t , y t } or, eventually, {x t , y t } follows a path through the regions R(I) → R(IV) → R(III) → R(II) → R(I).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that, when the fiscal constraint is binding, the map (14) reduces to the sub map
which has a unique fixed point at
The assumption of Lemma 1 implies that E λ is in region R(I); that is, the condition λ < 1 − 1/b guarantees that the map T λ , active when there is only a residual demand for real balances, does not allow the process to be absorbed outside region (I). It does not guarantee, however, that the process eventually remains in region (I) because, there may be cycling behavior along the four regions. In fact, Lemma 1 allows the existence of cyclic dynamics, which may be periodic or not, that move "clockwise" visiting the four regions in the order R
(I) → R(IV) → R(III) → R(II) → R(I), with fast transitions (just one time period) for R(II) → R(I) and R(IV) → R(III) or R(II), and with slower transitions for R(III) → R(II) and R(I) → R(IV).
The existence of this type of large-amplitude oscillation is strictly related to the value of the parameter , in the sense that the amplitude of the oscillations is inversely proportional to . We return to this issue when we analyze the global dynamics of the models.
Local Stability of π *
We first study the asymptotic stability (i.e., whether π e t → π * ) of paths with initial conditions in a neighborhood of the target (i.e., (π e 0 , π e 1 ) − E < ρ for some ρ > 0. Such local stability analysis of (14) around π * is relatively straightforward. It requires the characterization of the map (14) in region (I), possibly establishing conditions guaranteeing that the fiscal constraint is not binding for expectations close to the target and, finally, studying the eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian. We first briefly discuss the three policies and then compare them in terms of their local stability properties. For all of the policies, in the subregion of R(I) where the fiscal constraint is not binding, the map (14) reduces to the sub map T (P) * whose fixed points are the same than those of the rational expectations map (5). For convenience, policies are discussed in reverse order with respect to their appearance; that is, I, F, and O. In what follows, given an inflation target π
Policy I . The restriction of T (I ) to region R(I) is given by
The line s of equation
The map T (I ) | R(I ) can be written in the equivalent form
The map T (I) * has the unique fixed point E * = (π * , π * ), which is also a fixed point of T (I) provided that E * ∈ (I A ), that is, if the condition 1 − 1/π * < λ ≤ 1 holds. In other words, the target equilibrium is a steady state of the model if the fiscal constraint on seignorage is not too tight. With such a condition, the fixed point of the map T λ ,
We will restrict the fiscal constraint to satisfy
FIGURE 1. A superposition, in the parameter space , of the regions of local stability of the target equilibrium E * under the three different policies, with π * = 1.5. The region with left boundary OD is the stability region of E * under I , the one bounded by ABC refers to policy F, and the one with left boundary ED refers to policy O.
As long as condition (17) is satisfied, λ does not affect the local stability properties of E * . Indeed, let 
and E * is stable for α < α (I) h with the basin of attraction bounded, at least for values of α close to α (I) h , by a closed curve whose radius increases proportionally to α (I) h (b) − α.
Policy F. The restriction of T (F) to the region (I) is given by
.
The horizontal line q of equation
such that the map T (F) | (I) can be written in the equivalent form
if (x t , y t ) ∈ R(I A ).

As in the corresponding REE map (5), the map T (F) *
has two fixed points: the target E * = (π * , π * ) and
. These points also are fixed points for T (F) provided that they belong to the region (I A ) where the dynamics of T (F) are governed by the restriction T (F) * . It is easy to see that E * ∈ (I A ) if, λ > 1 − 1/π * , which is satisfied if condition (17) holds, and
As with policy I , we assume that condition (17) is satisfied.
On the basis of the analysis of the eigenvalues given in Appendix B.2, the target fixed point E * is stable in the region The unique fixed point E λ of the map T λ is also a fixed point for T (F) , provided it belongs to the region (I B ); that is, 
Policy O. The restriction of T (O) to region R(I) is given by
T (O) | R(I) :      x t+1 = y t y t+1 = (1 − α)y t + α m(x t ) m(y t ) − min m(π * ) − 1 π * m(x t ), λm(y t ) . (21) The line r of equation y = r (x) ≡ −(1/λπ * )x + π * /λ + (b e /λ)(1/π * + λ − 1
) separates the region R(I) into two subregions,
R(I A ) = {(x, y) ∈ R(I) | y < r(x)} and R(I B ) = {(x, y) ∈ R(I) | y > r(x)},
such that the map T (O) | (I) can be written in the equivalent form
if (x t , y t ) ∈ R(I A ).
As in the corresponding REE map (5) Figure 1 ). The unique fixed point E λ of the map T λ is also a fixed point for T (O) , provided it belongs to the region R(I B ); that is, if
Furthermore, E λ is locally stable, provided that b > (α + 1)/(1 − λ) (see Appendix B.4). In summary, we obtain local stability results that almost parallel those of policy F.
LEMMA 4. Assume λ ∈ * [i.e., condition (17)] and let (b, α) ∈ : 
Ranking policies according to their local stability properties.
Lemmas 2-4 show how the local stability properties of the inflation target π * differ across policies. In particular, assuming condition (17), the stability of the inflation target under the policies I, F, and O holds in the following domains of the parameters' space :
Therefore, we say that policy P dominates policy P , in terms of its local stability properties, if the inflation target equilibrium π * is locally stable in a larger domain of the parameter space , and denote such preference by P l P . Then, as corollary to Lemmas 2-4 we have the following propositions. A local stability ranking is not uniquely determined by l . For example, provided that the target is locally stable, we may be interested in whether convergence is monotone, which can make it easier to "pattern recognize" the tendency for inflation to converge to the target. Alternatively, we may be interested in the speed of convergence to the target. As we show in Appendix C, provided that the target is locally stable, only with policy O is convergence always monotone, whereas for other policies, monotone convergence requires a small enough value of α. Nevertheless, in terms of speed of convergence, policy O also tends to be dominated.
More As we have shown, the local stability analysis already allows us to rank inflation target policies and, in particular, it suggests disregarding the optimal policy O in favor of alternative policies. On the other hand, differences based on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of T (P) * tend to be relatively small and, therefore, the rankings are not very sharp. We now turn in the next subsection to the more interesting and novel global analysis of the three policies.
Global Stability of π *
As in the preceding subsection, we first briefly discuss global dynamics under the alternative policies and then we summarize the results comparing the three policies. As we will see, even if the local analysis also provides useful information concerning the global dynamics of the system, a more complete understanding is based on the study of the basins of attraction and, in particular, of some global bifurcations that cause qualitative changes in such basins, whose characterization requires the use of computer graphics. We focus our attention on the basin of attraction of π * , B(E * ), defined as the set of points of the plane x, y that generate trajectories converging to E * . Of particular interest is the role played by the fiscal constraint parameter λ and by the tracking parameter α in enlarging B(E * ). The global analysis becomes quite complex because of the possible coexistence of different attractors. As we will see, in all of these respects the three, apparently very similar, policies behave quite differently. Such differences could not be captured in a model in which only the asymptotic case α 0 is analyzed [e.g., Evans et al. (2000) ].
Policy I :
The role of fiscal constraints. As we have seen in Lemma 1, even when the inflation target is locally stable, there may be cycling paths following a large cyclical movement across the four regions. Figure 2 illustrates such behavior for policy I . In particular, Figure 2a shows, in the phase space x,y, the coexistence 
The basin of attraction of E * is represented by the gray region, whereas the basin of the "cyclic" attractor A( ) is represented by the white region (only partially visible in the figure) . (b) Two sequences of expected inflation rates are represented relative to time, one generated by an initial condition taken in the gray region of (a) and the other one generated by an initial condition taken in the white region.
of a large "cyclic" attractor A( ), whose basin is represented by the white region, with the SREE π * whose basin B(E * ) is represented by the gray region. Figure 2b shows two paths, each of which starts from an initial expected inflation taken in a different basin of attraction.
In Figure 2a , B(E * ) is contained in the interior of subregion (I A ). This is a snapshot corresponding to fixed values of b, α, and λ. Nevertheless, changing these parameters also causes B(E * ) to change. In particular, numerical simulations show how the size of B(E * ) increases for decreasing values of α (or increasing values of b) until the basin boundary ∂B(E * ) has a contact with the big cyclic attractor A( ). This contact causes the disappearance of A( ) Mira (1978, 1980) ] and, consequently, E * becomes a global attractor; that is, B(E * ) covers the whole phase space. Such a contact bifurcation is called final bifurcation in Mira et al. (1996) and Abraham et al. (1997) or boundary crisis in Grebogi et al. (1983) . This bifurcation cannot be revealed by a local study, that is, based on the linear approximation of the dynamical system. An interesting result is obtained if the influence of the parameter λ on the size and the shape of B(E * ) is considered. In fact, even if λ does not influence the local stability of E * when condition (17) is assumed, it may influence the shape and the size of B(E * ). This is clearly shown in Figure 3 , where we start with a situation similar to that of Figure 2a (see Figure 3a) and, keeping all of the other parameters fixed, we successively decrease λ, making the fiscal constraint tighter. In Figure 3b , B(E * ) intersects the subregion R(I B ) where dynamics are dominated by the sub map T λ . The contact between the basin boundary ∂B(E * ) and the line s, which separates the subregions R(I A ) and R(I B ), causes a sudden enlargement of * . In (a), λ = 0.5, and the basin is entirely included in the region (I A ). In (b), λ = 0.42, after the contact between the basin boundary and the line s. In (c), λ = 0.4195 at the contact between the basin boundary and the line x = b − . In (d), λ = 0.419, after the contact between the basin boundary and the line x = b − , the basin of E * covers the whole plane; that is, E * is globally stable.
the basin B(E * ). In fact, after such contact, if E λ is stable for T λ and E λ ∈ B(E * ), then some trajectories starting from region R(I B ) may move toward E λ and, consequently, enter the basin B(E * ). We may say that E λ behaves as a catalyst because it attracts trajectories coming from the subregion R(I B ) and then it conveys them toward E * because E λ ∈ B(E * ). Moreover, a small reduction of λ causes B(E * ) to increase to the point where the basin boundary ∂B(E * ) contacts the line b (see Figure 3c ), producing a global (or contact) bifurcation. As Figure 3d shows, as a result of such a global bifurcation, B(E * ) coversthe entire phase space under consideration, so that global stability is achieved.
In summary, Figure 3 shows how fiscal constraints can enhance the global stability properties of an inflation target policy (such as I ) even when the constraints have no effect on local stability properties of the inflation policy.
It is important to remark that, since the equations of the curves that form ∂B(E * ) are not known, an analytical computation of the parameters values at which the contacts between ∂B(E * ) and the lines s and b = b occur is not possible. Hence, these parameters can only be revealed numerically, by a graphical analysis. Indeed, computational methods are a standard tool in the global study of dynamical systems of dimension greater than one [see, e.g., Mira et al. (1996) , Brock and Hommes (1997) ].
Policy F:
The coexistence of two attracting fixed points. As Lemma 3(ii) shows, the fixed points E * and E λ may coexist, both being locally stable. In this case of two coexisting attractors, the initial condition is crucial in order to forecast the long-run behavior of the system; it is therefore important to study the boundaries of the respective basins of attraction. As with policy I , when E * is the only attractor, decreasing α or λ, or increasing b, enhances the stability of π * , and B(E * ) expands. However, when both E * and E λ are attractors, these changes of parameters tend to enhance the stability properties of both attractors and it may well be that the effect is stronger for E λ , in which case B(E λ ) will enlarge while B(E * ) will contract. This is shown in Figure 4 , where we start in a situation in which both attractors coexist, but just after the subcritical Neimark-Hopf bifurcation at which E λ becomes stable and, therefore, B(E * ) encompasses almost all of the phase space [see Figure 4a ; notice that the Neimark-Hopf bifurcation at which E λ becomes stable occurs at α = (1 − λ)b − 1 = 0.25]. In Figures 4b-d , we successively reduce the tracking parameter α while keeping all other parameters constant. As α is decreased, B(E λ ) enlarges and its boundary has a contact with the line q. After this contact, a sudden change of B(E λ ) is observed, as shown in Figure 4b . Now the boundary of the basin B(E λ ) includes the saddle point B * and, consequently, points that are very close to E * belong to B(E λ ). Furthermore, if α is further decreased, B(E λ ) continues to enlarge until a contact with the line x = b occurs (see Figure 4c) , which marks another evident qualitative change, as Figure 4d shows.
In summary, Figure 4 shows how the presence of coexisting attractors (as may occur under policy F) can induce counterintuitive effects on the stability properties of the inflation target π * when parameters are changed.
Policy O:
The coexistence of two attracting fixed points and a chaotic attractor. Lemma 4(ii) shows that, with the policy O, the fixed points E * and E λ can coexist as attractors. However, as Figure 5 shows, the situation may be more complex: In particular, Figure 5b shows the existence of a chaotic attractor around E λ . In this figure the dark-gray and the light-gray regions represent the basins of E * and E λ , respectively, whereas the points of the white region converge to the chaotic attractor. Notice that the basin B(E λ ) is formed by two disjoint portions. However, as the parameter α is decreased, the chaotic attractor disappears after a contact with its basin boundary, a typical final bifurcation (or boundary crisis); see Figure 5b . In summary, Figure 5 shows that the global dynamics can be quite complex. However, decreasing α (or increasing b) tends to simplify the dynamics of the model in favor of the attracting fixed points. As in Figure 4 , however, stability may be enhanced more for E λ than for E * "global convergence." More precisely, given a set of parameters (α, b, λ), we numerically generate paths from all initial conditions (x 0 , y 0 ) taken within a fine grid in a wide portion of the (x,y) plane, and we count how many of such paths converge to the target. Figure 6 shows the results of these computations, made for many values of (b, λ) , whose values are represented on the axes, and two different values of α. From Lemmas 3(ii) and 4(ii), for values (λ, b) between the curves λ
, respectively, the attractor E * may coexist with the attractor E λ , whereas for values of
, E * is the unique attractor. In contrast, for policy I , there is a unique fixed point that can be an attractor [E λ is in subregion R(I A )], which results in a better performance of this policy in terms of global stability for relatively low values of α. For relatively high values of α, however, the target may cease to be stable and policy F may dominate policy I in terms of global stability.
In summary, Figure 6 11 reinforces the local stability ranking of policies. In particular, the global stability results are consistent with Propositions 1 and 2 in showing that the so-called optimal policy O tends to be outperformed, as a stabilization policy, by either the unconditional Friedman policy F or the adaptive inertia policy I when private agents form their expectations adaptively. 
CONCLUSIONS
Stabilization policies must be judged by their stability properties. Within rational expectations equilibria, such a statement is not even meaningful. It is meaningful, however, when we consider that agents may form their expectations adaptively. Experimental evidence [see, e.g., Marimon and Sunder (1993 , 1994 , 1995 ] supports this adaptive view and can provide an empirical ground for our stability results. 12 The fact that our local and global stability rankings are consistent is encouraging. In particular, our results reinforce Friedman's caution against "overly reactive" rules. Friedman had an intuition about policy lags that could apply to any model. In contrast, we provide a careful stability analysis of a relatively simple model without policy lags. Even so, some lessons emerge that are likely to apply to other models. First, and foremost, the misspecification that private agents have rational expectations when, in fact, they do not, may lead to a wrong policy design, in the sense that alternative designs of stabilization policies may outperform the rules designed under the rational expectations assumption. Second, even leaving aside time-consistency considerations or "fiscal theory of money" considerations [see, e.g., Woodford (1996) ], fiscal constraints, in particular, seignorage constraints, may play an important role in helping stabilization policies to achieve their goals.
13 Third, even if monetary authorities follow-with full commitment-their announced inflation target rules, inflation may differ substantially from the target. Whereas, for example, inflationary episodes above the target are usually associated with loose monetary policy or weak monetary authorities, in our economies such instability may well correspond to the fact that, due to the existence of money substitutes, the inflation target may not be too far from the level of inflation in which there is a currency collapse. Furthermore, our global analysis also provides a good reason to study the point of currency collapse: It is the point where a globalcontact bifurcation occurs, resulting in a qualitative improvement of the stability properties of the policy.
There is room for further research in several directions: studying other misspecified models, introducing stochastic learning, and so on. In such extensions, it would be interesting to see if the relatively good performance (as a stabilization policy) of Friedman's-constant-money-growth rule persists. We find it a remarkable result that may generalize to other environments.
NOTES
1. See Sargent (1999) for a discussion of adaptive models with misspecified beliefs. 2. For a detailed account of E-stability theory, see, for example, Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) . 3. See, for example, Mira et al. (1996) , Abraham et al. (1997) , and Bischi et al. (1998) for an introduction to the these results on contact bifurcations.
4. Implicitly we assume that, within equivalent policies resulting in the same d policy, there is (local) Ricardian equivalence; that is, present-value considerations do not discriminate among these equivalent policies.
5. In a stochastic model, the question is what should the government do when, at some confidence level, it infers that the predictions of private agent are not consistent with rational expectations, given the government policy.
6. See, for example, Marimon and McGrattan (1994) and Fudenberg and Levine (1998) . 7. For example, in the EMU, seignorage of the ECB is restricted; furthermore, the Growth and Stability Pact constrains deficits and, in the United States, balanced-budget proposals are recurrently being considered.
8. Notice that, for notational convenience, we also denote by m d (π e ) the demand for real balances with precautionary savings.
9. Lettau and van Zandt (1999) , in contrast with Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b) , show that if agents react to current prices and do not focus on MSV solutions, the stability properties of the adaptive learning process change. Recently, however, Adam (2000) has shown that, if Cagan's hyperinflationary model is properly developed to meaningfully allow for conditioning on current prices, most of the Marcet and Sargent results prevail.
10. Notice that one could also consider that agents give some weight to the announced target, such as π e t+1 = (1 − γ t )[(1 − α t )π e t + α t π t − 1 ] + γ t π * . However, although in such a rule tends to help the stability properties of the target, it complicates the analysis without providing new insights.
11. Similar computations, not reported here, are available on request. 12. In fact, Evans et al. (2000b) provide some experimental results showing the stabilization power of fiscal constraints.
13. Notice, however, that if fiscal constraints are too tight, the target may not be a stationary equilibrium.
14. The rigorous proof of the subcritical nature of the Hopf bifurcation requires the evaluation of some long expressions involving derivatives of the map up to order 3. In this case, we claim numerical evidence.
APPENDIX B: LOCAL STABILITY ANALYSIS
In this Appendix, we analyze the local stability of the fixed points of the maps T that give necessary and sufficient conditions for the two eigenvalues of (B.1) be inside the unit circle of the complex plane [see, e.g., Gumowski and Mira (1980 p. 159) ].
B.1 MAP T (I) *
The Jacobian matrix of the map T Since b > π * in the parameter space , a sufficient condition for the stability of E * is
The vanishing of the left-hand side of (25) gives a line, in the parameter space b, α, such that if (b, α) crosses that line from left to right a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues enters the unit circle and a subcritical Neimark-Hopf bifurcation occurs at which the fixed point E * is changed from unstable focus to stable focus, and a repelling closed invariant orbit is created around it 14 [see, e.g., Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983, p. 162) ]. Just after its creation, such a closed curve is smooth and approximately of circular shape, with radius proportional to the square root of the distance of the point (b, α) from the bifurcation line, at least for values of (b, α) close to the bifurcation curve [see, e.g., Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983, p. 305) ].
B.3. MAP T (O) *
The Jacobian matrix at the fixed point E * , is 
B.4. MAP T λ
The Jacobian matrix of the map (15) evaluated at the unique fixed point E λ is which are both satisfied in the set (see Figure 7) . 
